Counterpoint: Misreading Realities – A Rebuttal to the International Crisis Group’s Analysis on Rohingya Insurgency Risks

As of mid-2025, nearly one million Rohingya refugees remain confined to overcrowded, restricted camps in southeastern Bangladesh. Years after the brutal ethnic cleansing operations launched by Myanmar’s Tatmadaw in 2017, repatriation efforts remain frozen, justice mechanisms are slow-moving, and international pressure on Naypyidaw is virtually non-existent. Against this backdrop, the International Crisis Group (ICG) published a report titled “Bangladesh/Myanmar: The Dangers of a Rohingya Insurgency”. While the report correctly highlights the rising despair and risks of radicalisation, its framing is analytically flawed, its recommendations underdeveloped, and its understanding of regional security architecture superficial.

This rebuttal by BDMilitary.com aims to correct those misconceptions, re-centre the debate on Myanmar’s culpability, and provide an evidence-based counter analysis for policymakers, security professionals, and humanitarian actors.

Bangladesh: Absorbing a Crisis It Did Not Create

The ICG report tends to downplay the foundational truth of the crisis: Myanmar’s military orchestrated systematic violence, mass rape, and ethnic cleansing, forcibly displacing an entire people into a neighbouring country. The burden of housing, feeding, and protecting nearly a million stateless individuals has fallen almost entirely on Bangladesh, a densely populated developing country that has, despite limited resources, displayed extraordinary restraint and humanitarian commitment.

To imply that Bangladesh’s security posture may exacerbate radicalisation or enable insurgency is not only misleading it borders on methodologically problematic. The government of Bangladesh has:

• Digitally registered over 900,000 Rohingya using UNHCR-supported biometric systems;
• Deployed Armed Police Battalion (APBn) units to prevent organised crime and trafficking;
• Repeatedly rejected any notion of arming, training, or supporting insurgents.

Bangladesh’s consistent call has been for voluntary, safe, and dignified repatriation under international supervision. It has refrained from any cross-border operation or militarised posturing even when Myanmar provocatively flew helicopters near the border or laid mines along fence lines in 2022–2023.

Misunderstanding ARSA and RSO: Insurgents or Narco-Criminals?

The ICG analysis gives disproportionate focus to ARSA (Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army) and RSO (Rohingya Solidarity Organisation). Both groups, though having historical presence, are no longer coherent insurgent entities. They have devolved into fragmented networks engaged in narcotics trafficking, extortion, and intimidation within the camps.

Bangladesh’s law enforcement agencies have arrested over 100 ARSA-linked operatives since 2021 including its chiefs. Camp leaders and Rohingya civil society bodies, such as the Arakan Rohingya Society for Peace and Human Rights, have publicly disavowed these groups, stating that they do not represent the aspirations of the community.

There is no evidence that these groups possess:

• Strategic command structures,
• Territory inside Myanmar or Bangladesh,
• External state sponsors, or
• Ideological alignment with global jihadist networks like al-Qaeda or ISIS.

In fact, Bangladesh’s intelligence community has not detected any foreign-funded jihadist activity within the Rohingya population. There are no madrasa networks or ideological recruitment drives operating at scale in the camps. Frustration, yes. Islamist radicalisation, no.

The Camps: Criminally Exploited, Not Ideologically Radicalised

The report paints the refugee camps as potential insurgency incubators. This mischaracterises the real picture. The camps, while facing:

• Poor sanitation,
• Limited education opportunities, and
• Deep psychological trauma,

are also among the most closely monitored humanitarian zones in Asia. Every refugee has been biometrically registered by UNHCR, movements are monitored, and law enforcement maintains a 24/7 presence. APBn units, operating under the Ministry of Home Affairs—not the military—are trained in human rights protocols and regularly rotate deployments.

Rather than becoming ideologically radicalised, most Rohingya youth face nihilistic despair. Their greatest fear is being forgotten by the world, not being recruited by insurgents. Crime and exploitation are serious challenges, but these are symptoms of statelessness and prolonged encampment, not doctrinal extremism.

Arakan Army: Not a Viable Partner, Nor a Humanitarian Actor

The ICG’s report subtly positions the Arakan Army (AA) as a potential counterweight to ARSA and a force capable of improving conditions in Rakhine State. This framing, however, misjudges both the strategic posture of the AA and Bangladesh’s principled foreign policy.

While the AA has emerged as a potent non-state actor controlling large swathes of northern Rakhine, it remains a non-state, armed ethno-nationalist group that only recently ceased being designated a terrorist organisation by Myanmar. More importantly, the AA has a documented track record of targeting Rohingya civilians as part of its campaign to consolidate power and ethnic homogeneity in Rakhine.

Independent reports and field testimonies confirm that:

• AA units have forcibly conscripted Rohingya youth in areas of conflict,
• Displaced or intimidated Rohingya families under their jurisdiction,
• And have restricted humanitarian access to Rohingya populations for political leverage.

Bangladesh cannot and will not formally engage the Arakan Army, for the following reasons:

1. International Legal Norms
   As a responsible actor in the international system, Bangladesh abides by the principle of non-recognition of non-state armed groups. Engagement with the AA would:
   • Undermine its position in ongoing legal proceedings at the International Court of Justice;
   • Risk diplomatic tensions with ASEAN states wary of separatist insurgencies;
   • Set a dangerous precedent that weakens norms around sovereignty.
2. Ethnic Exclusivism and Atrocities
   The Arakan Army’s vision of an “ethnically pure” Arakan does not include the Rohingya. It has shown no inclination to protect Rohingya rights, nor to engage in inclusive governance in areas under its control. This mirrors, in a more decentralised form, the exclusionary policies of the Tatmadaw.
3. Security Implications
   Formal engagement with the AA could provoke Myanmar into hostile responses along the southeastern border, endanger refugee populations, and invite accusations of cross-border interference.
4. Strategic Redundancy
   The AA offers no guarantees for repatriation, protection, or humanitarian access. To frame them as a constructive actor is both premature and deeply flawed.

For these reasons, Bangladesh rejects any suggestion of aligning with or supporting the Arakan Army. Its actions continue to destabilise conditions necessary for Rohingya return and blur the lines between liberator and abuser.

Repatriation Is the Only Sustainable Solution

The core driver of instability is not Bangladesh’s security policy, but the continued statelessness of the Rohingya. Without political rights, citizenship guarantees, and international monitoring inside Rakhine State, no durable repatriation is possible.

Myanmar, emboldened by global silence and Chinese backing, has weaponised the idea of “Rohingya insurgency” to:

• Justify further militarisation of Rakhine,
• Avoid citizenship reform, and
• Paint itself as a victim of cross-border terrorism.

Framing the Rohingya as insurgents only strengthens the junta’s position and weakens international advocacy for justice and repatriation.

Recommendations for the International Community

Rather than second-guessing Bangladesh’s internal policy, the international community guided by think tanks like ICG should focus on:

• Pressuring Myanmar through real sanctions and arms embargoes;
• Funding humanitarian operations in Bangladesh, which remain grossly underfinanced;
• Expanding ICJ and ICC processes against military perpetrators;
• Stopping all attempts to deport Rohingya from neighbouring countries back to Myanmar;
• Empowering Rohingya civilian organisations, not violent groups.

Key Takeaways

• ARSA and RSO are fragmented criminal networks, not viable insurgents.
• Bangladesh has no role in arming or sheltering any insurgent activity.
• Rohingya camps are heavily monitored and policed, not jihadist breeding grounds.
• The Arakan Army has committed abuses against Rohingya and cannot be a partner for repatriation.
• The real beneficiary of “insurgency” narratives is Myanmar’s junta.
• Regional failure not host country policy is prolonging this crisis.

Final Word

The International Crisis Group has contributed meaningfully to conflict resolution around the world. However, this particular report fails to capture the complexities of the Rohingya crisis and misattributes potential threats to the wrong actor.

It is Myanmar’s military, not Bangladesh’s government, that created the conditions for instability, insurgency, and statelessness. Until that reality is confronted head-on, the Rohingya will remain pawns in a game where peace is promised but never delivered.