The announcement of a new defence pact between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan has sent ripples through both the Middle East and South Asia. More than a bilateral understanding, it is a signal of how security in these two regions is converging. Both sides describe the pact as a commitment to a shared response to aggression, but the subtext is clear: Pakistan’s nuclear status gives the deal an aura of extended deterrence that alters the strategic landscape far beyond Islamabad and Riyadh.
For the Middle East, the implications are immediate. Saudi Arabia, long reliant on Washington’s protection, now appears to be diversifying its security guarantees. Whether or not the pact formally extends Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella, perceptions matter. For Iran, the message is that Riyadh has credible backing outside the United States. For Israel, it is a reminder that the Gulf’s strategic posture is becoming more complex and less predictable. Both will adjust their calculations accordingly, and that means greater risks of escalation in a region already fraught with proxy conflicts and contested deterrence.
In South Asia, the deal complicates an already delicate balance. India will scrutinise the pact, knowing that Pakistan’s involvement in Gulf crises could either constrain its flexibility in dealing with New Delhi or embolden it with new confidence. Nuclear deterrence, once confined largely to the subcontinent, now risks being perceived as a factor in Middle Eastern rivalries. This blurring of theatres raises the possibility of miscalculation, where a crisis in the Gulf could draw Islamabad into commitments that reverberate back onto the Indo-Pak frontier.
For Bangladesh, the stakes are different but no less serious. Consider the numbers. In 2023, remittances from Saudi Arabia to Bangladesh reached nearly USD 3.8 billion, making Riyadh Dhaka’s largest source of foreign currency inflows. Over 2.6 million Bangladeshis live and work in the Kingdom, forming the backbone of our overseas labour force. Any disruption in Saudi stability would have a direct impact on household incomes across Bangladesh and on the country’s foreign exchange reserves. When nearly 13 million Bangladeshis abroad are sending back money that sustains our economy, the security of their host nations becomes an indirect national security issue for Dhaka.
This dependence sits alongside fiscal constraints at home. The defence budget for FY 2025-26 stands at Tk 40,698 crore, about USD 3.3 billion. While this seems large in absolute terms, much of it is consumed by salaries and operations, leaving limited scope for procurement and modernisation. Defence spending is trending downward as a share of GDP, projected to fall to around 1.5% in the coming years. In other words, Bangladesh has neither the fiscal space nor the strategic need to commit itself to automatic military obligations in distant conflicts.
Should Dhaka, then, contemplate signing a defence pact with a nuclear power along the lines of the Saudi–Pakistan agreement? The answer must be no. Such a move would contradict our long-standing commitment to non-alignment and non-proliferation, expose us to risks far removed from our own borders, and strain relations with neighbours who already view our strategic posture with suspicion. A nuclear umbrella may look attractive on paper, but for Bangladesh it would mean being dragged into conflicts that are neither of our making nor in our interest.
This does not mean Bangladesh should remain passive. The Saudi–Pakistan pact underlines the importance of thinking carefully about our own vulnerabilities and priorities. Dhaka should deepen cooperation in areas where the benefits are tangible and the risks manageable: maritime security in the Bay of Bengal, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, counter-terror intelligence sharing, and protocols for protecting our expatriates in the Gulf. These are the areas where practical cooperation enhances national security without entangling us in great-power rivalries.
The lesson from Riyadh and Islamabad’s bold gambit is that smaller states must tread carefully when nuclear deterrence begins to spill across regions. Bangladesh’s strength lies in restraint, prudence, and balance. We should safeguard our expatriates, protect our economy, modernise our forces within our means, and remain consistent in our diplomatic stance against nuclear entanglements. Strategic independence is what will serve us best in an era of shifting alliances and uncertain deterrence.
Ayesha Farid is a regional security specialist focusing on South Asia, with over a decade of experience analysing inter-state tensions, cross-border insurgency, and regional power dynamics. Holding a Master’s degree in International Relations and having worked with several policy think tanks and academic institutions, she offers nuanced insights into the security challenges shaping the subcontinent. Ayesha’s expertise lies in mapping military doctrines, border disputes, and regional cooperation frameworks, making her a key contributor to BDMilitary’s coverage of South Asian strategic affairs. She heads the Geopolitics & Diplomacy section at BDMilitary.
