Bangladesh may be strategically positioned to join a regional bloc with China and Pakistan, excluding India, Foreign Affairs Adviser Md Touhid Hossain has said, signalling a potentially significant shift in South Asian geopolitics.
Responding to a question at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Tuesday, Touhid noted that while such a grouping would not be feasible for landlocked neighbours such as Nepal and Bhutan, it remained “strategically possible” for Bangladesh.
“It is possible for us strategically, but it is not possible for Nepal or Bhutan to form a grouping with Pakistan excluding India,” he said.
His remarks follow a statement by Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar at the Islamabad Conclave, where he revealed that a new trilateral initiative involving Bangladesh, China and Pakistan had already begun and could expand to include other regional and extra-regional partners.
Touhid adopted a cautious tone on the proposal, saying he had come across the information through the media and that “perhaps at some point this could see some progress”.
Military Perspective: Security Comes First
A senior official from the Bangladesh military, speaking on condition of anonymity, said any regional alignment would be evaluated strictly through national security considerations.
“Yes, a localised bloc focused on South Asian security concerns could be beneficial for Bangladesh,” the official said. “It could enhance defence cooperation, intelligence sharing and strategic balancing. However, no such decision can be taken lightly, as it would have long-term implications for our national security and regional stability.”
The official stressed that Bangladesh’s armed forces would prioritise sovereignty, territorial integrity and strategic autonomy in advising the government.
Tensions with India and the Peelkhana Findings
The latest diplomatic developments come amid renewed political and strategic tension between Dhaka and New Delhi, following the findings of a commission that investigated the 2009 Peelkhana massacre.
According to the commission’s conclusions, foreign involvement was detected in efforts to weaken the Bangladesh Army, with India alleged to have had a role in destabilising the force. These findings have injected a highly sensitive dimension into Bangladesh’s strategic outlook. India has not formally accepted the commission’s claims.
Relations have also been strained by Bangladesh’s repeated demands for the return of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and thousands of Awami League members, many of whom Dhaka describes as fugitives. India continues to shelter Sheikh Hasina along with a large number of senior Awami League figures, a matter that has generated considerable diplomatic friction and public resentment in Bangladesh.
Long-Standing Bilateral Disputes and Security Concerns
Bangladesh’s relations with India have been further complicated by a series of long-standing unresolved disputes and security-related grievances. Key sticking points include the failure to conclude comprehensive water-sharing agreements on major transboundary rivers, allegations of unabated extrajudicial killings of Bangladeshi civilians by India’s Border Security Force, and repeated incidents of illegal Indian fishing inside Bangladesh’s territorial waters.
Dhaka has also raised serious concerns over what it describes as continued Indian support for insurgent and terrorist elements operating in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), which Bangladesh views as a direct threat to its internal security and territorial stability.
In addition, the widening trade disparity between the two neighbours remains a major source of discontent, with Bangladeshi exports facing persistent non-tariff barriers while imports from India continue to dominate the bilateral trade balance.
Strategic Leverage and Diplomatic Risk
Analysts believe a China–Pakistan–Bangladesh alignment could enhance Dhaka’s bargaining power with New Delhi, particularly on contentious issues such as water sharing, border management, trade imbalance and security cooperation.
A localised bloc focused on South Asian concerns could provide Bangladesh with greater strategic leverage and reduce over-dependence on any single regional power. China’s economic footprint and Pakistan’s security cooperation could further strengthen Bangladesh’s regional standing.
However, such a move is fraught with diplomatic risks. Observers warn that formal participation in a bloc excluding India could worsen relations with New Delhi unless India fundamentally shifts what Dhaka often perceives as a rigid, security-centric and unilateral approach towards its neighbours. India remains Bangladesh’s largest neighbour, a major trading partner and a key stakeholder in regional infrastructure, energy transit and security frameworks.
Economic, Political and Security Calculations
Government sources indicate that any decision on joining a new regional grouping would be subjected to extensive inter-ministerial and strategic scrutiny. Economic gains, political costs and, above all, strategic and security implications will dominate the deliberations.
Bangladesh’s strategic location on the Bay of Bengal, its growing economy and its expanding defence capabilities make it an increasingly important regional actor. At the same time, its leadership has traditionally pursued a policy of strategic balance, maintaining functional relations with all major powers.
Future Outlook: A Delicate Balancing Act
For now, Dhaka appears to be keeping its options open. While the idea of a trilateral or expanded bloc with China and Pakistan is being discussed at a diplomatic level, no formal commitment has yet been made.
In the coming months, Bangladesh is expected to quietly assess how such an alignment would affect its relations with India, the United States, ASEAN partners and the wider Indo-Pacific region. The country’s leadership faces a delicate balancing act: expanding strategic autonomy and regional bargaining power without triggering instability or economic disruption.
Ultimately, whether Bangladesh moves closer to a China–Pakistan axis will depend on how it weighs economic opportunity against political fallout — and, most critically, the long-term security interests of the nation.
Ayesha Farid is a regional security specialist focusing on South Asia, with over a decade of experience analysing inter-state tensions, cross-border insurgency, and regional power dynamics. She has worked with leading policy think tanks and academic institutions, offering nuanced insights into the complex security challenges shaping the subcontinent. Ayesha’s expertise spans military doctrines, border disputes, and regional cooperation frameworks, making her a vital contributor to BDMilitary’s coverage of South Asian strategic affairs. She leads the Geopolitics & Diplomacy section at BDMilitary. Ayesha holds a dual master’s degree — a Master in International Relations from the IE School of Politics, Economics & Global Affairs, Spain, and a Master of Public Policy from the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto, Canada — combining deep academic insight with practical policy expertise.
