The International Crimes Tribunal’s sentencing of former prime minister Sheikh Hasina to death for crimes against humanity during last year’s July Uprising has precipitated one of the most consequential diplomatic confrontations between Bangladesh and India in decades. Her flight to Delhi, India’s refusal to respond to Bangladesh’s formal extradition requests, and the political calculations now gripping the Indian establishment have created a crisis that extends far beyond the legal domain. At stake are the future of bilateral ties, the credibility of India’s regional posture, and the strategic direction of Bangladesh’s intelligence and security doctrine.
Bangladesh has acted with complete adherence to its legal obligations. The extradition treaty is clear. The offences are categorically extraditable. A formal request has been issued. An arrest warrant has been delivered. The conviction has been handed down by a sitting international crimes tribunal. The rule of law has been followed at every stage. Yet India remains silent, calculating, and deeply hesitant.
The reasons for this hesitancy are neither legal nor procedural. They are political, strategic, and rooted in India’s fear of what Sheikh Hasina may reveal if she is returned to Dhaka. Delhi now faces a complex dilemma: comply with the treaty and expose its own covert role inside Bangladesh, or defy the treaty and face a long-term deterioration in bilateral trust which will reshape the geopolitical landscape of South Asia.
This feature examines the background of the crisis, the legal dimensions of Hasina’s extradition, India’s political calculations, Dhaka’s realistic options, and the wider repercussions for both states.
The Unravelling of a Strategic Alliance
For nearly fifteen years, Sheikh Hasina was India’s closest political ally in Dhaka. Her government aligned Bangladesh’s security policies with Indian interests on issues ranging from counterterrorism to border management. Critical concessions on transit, energy sharing, and regional security cooperation were delivered repeatedly, often at the expense of domestic political goodwill. RAW enjoyed unprecedented access to political, administrative, and security circles within Bangladesh during her rule. Indian influence permeated multiple sectors of policy formulation, while Awami League maintained a deeply symbiotic relationship with Indian political elites.
However, her government’s spectacular collapse during the July Uprising exposed the fragility of that arrangement. Despite its vast intelligence network, its close relationships within the Awami League ecosystem, and its overt political support for Hasina, India was unable to prevent the collapse. For Delhi, this was an enormous strategic embarrassment. India’s closest regional protege had been overthrown by a mass movement before its intelligence services could pre-empt or contain the unrest. The collapse signalled to other Indian-aligned actors across South Asia that Delhi’s ability to shield its preferred political clients might not be as absolute as previously assumed.
Hasina’s flight to India on 5 August, described by Indian media as arriving as a “guest” of the government, was itself a symbolic moment. She had taken refuge in the very state whose intelligence apparatus had failed to anticipate her downfall. For the new interim government in Dhaka, this made India a party to the crisis from its earliest stages. And as Hasina began issuing statements, giving interviews to foreign media, and making political interventions from her base in Delhi, bilateral friction intensified dramatically.
The Legal Position: Bangladesh Has Fulfilled All Obligations
Bangladesh’s legal case for Hasina’s extradition is straightforward. The 2013 extradition treaty between the two countries outlines clearly that individuals convicted of crimes such as murder, incitement to murder, arson resulting in loss of life, and crimes recognised under multilateral treaties may be extradited upon request. The offences for which Hasina has been convicted fall squarely within these categories. The ICT verdict cites specific incidents of killings, burnings, the use of lethal weapons, and deliberate actions resulting in loss of life during the July Uprising. None of these can be construed as political offences. The treaty identifies thirteen categories of crimes that cannot be considered politically motivated, and Hasina’s charges fall within these non-political categories.
In December, Bangladesh submitted a formal request for extradition through a note verbale. In June, an ICT arrest warrant was issued. Following the verdict, the interim government renewed its demand, stating that India has a legal obligation under the treaty to return the convicted individuals. Dhaka has followed every requirement of due process. Chief Prosecutor Tajul Islam has confirmed that the extradition request will also be sent through Interpol to strengthen procedural consistency.
In contrast, India has neither refused nor accepted the request. It has acknowledged receipt but declined substantive engagement. Its statements have been carefully worded, emphasising its desire to act in the “best interests” of the Bangladeshi people but avoiding any direct reference to Hasina’s legal status.
Former diplomat Prabhu Dayal notes that any extradition application would need to pass through India’s courts, where Hasina would be able to challenge it, potentially leading to a prolonged judicial process. This procedural route allows India to stall indefinitely while maintaining the appearance of legal formality. However, behind the veneer of legal ambiguity lie profound political calculations.
India’s Strategic Dilemma: Why Delhi Cannot Extradite Hasina
India’s reluctance to extradite Hasina does not stem from legal concerns. It stems from fear. Hasina possesses intimate knowledge of India’s covert operations, political manoeuvres, and intelligence activities in Bangladesh. If she returns to Dhaka, she may be compelled by legal pressure, personal desperation, or strategic necessity to disclose details that India cannot afford to see made public.
The most sensitive areas of exposure include RAW’s operational networks inside Bangladesh, its methods of political influence, and the mechanisms through which segments of the Awami League leadership facilitated Indian interests. She also holds knowledge concerning allegations of Indian involvement in extrajudicial killings, cross-border intelligence operations, enforced disappearances, and clandestine efforts to influence elements within the Bangladesh Armed Forces. Such disclosures would inflict irreparable damage to India’s regional credibility, undermine its intelligence partnerships, and invite international scrutiny into its covert activities.
Additionally, it has long been alleged that Indian agencies, Awami League operatives, and compromised officers within the military and the former Bangladesh Rifles played a role in the events leading to the 2009 BDR Mutiny. Whether substantiated or not, any testimony from Hasina implicating Indian actors would carry enormous reputational risks for Delhi.
From a geopolitical standpoint, India must also consider the message it sends to its other regional partners. If Delhi surrenders a loyal client in the face of legal pressure, it undermines its image as a reliable protector for political allies and intelligence assets. India has historically offered refuge to sympathetic political figures throughout the region. Failing to protect Hasina would erode this reputation and discourage future cooperation from individuals or groups who rely on India’s patronage for protection.
Consequently, India’s dilemma is as much about internal political dynamics as it is about regional strategy. Certain factions within India’s foreign policy, intelligence, and business communities remain deeply aligned with Hasina. Her extradition would generate domestic political fractures within these networks.
This multifaceted dilemma explains India’s current silence. Delhi understands that returning Hasina to Bangladesh would not simply mean sending back a convicted criminal—it would mean relinquishing a figure who could expose years of covert Indian influence.
The Treaty Loophole: India’s Legal Escape Route
Indian media outlets have emphasised one specific clause within the treaty: Article 6, which allows the requested state to refuse extradition if the offence is deemed to be of a political character. Although the treaty explicitly excludes crimes such as murder, arson, and crimes against humanity from being classified as political, India may still attempt to stretch this clause to justify refusal. Hasina’s lawyers and Indian commentators have already framed the charges as being “politically motivated,” despite the fact that the ICT verdict is grounded in extensive evidence and pertains to international humanitarian crimes.
India may therefore attempt to cloak a political decision behind a legal argument. By allowing Hasina to challenge the extradition through the courts, India can delay proceedings indefinitely without formally refusing the request. This strategy preserves plausible deniability while protecting Indian interests.
Bangladesh’s Limited Diplomatic Options
Despite the strength of its legal case, Bangladesh faces significant constraints in pursuing Hasina’s extradition through formal diplomatic channels. Former ambassador Munshi Faiz Ahmad notes that Dhaka’s options are limited to sending formal communications, raising the issue in bilateral discussions, engaging Interpol, and maintaining the legal narrative internationally. Ultimately, however, India retains decisive control over the process.
Bangladesh cannot meaningfully pressure India through conventional diplomacy. The two countries do not share symmetrical leverage. Trade, connectivity, border management, and regional cooperation all rest heavily on India’s willingness to engage constructively. If Bangladesh applies overt diplomatic pressure, India may retaliate through trade restrictions, visa policies, non-tariff barriers, or other coercive measures. Given the current volatility in bilateral relations, such retaliation is not only possible but likely.
This asymmetry leaves Bangladesh in a difficult position. If India continues to reject or delay the extradition request, Dhaka must consider whether to let the issue obstruct broader bilateral ties or to compartmentalise it while pursuing other priorities.
Yet even as Bangladesh remains limited in the formal arena, India’s refusal opens an entirely new strategic domain for Dhaka: the realm of covert and intelligence-based operations.
The Intelligence Dimension: Options Beyond Diplomacy
India’s decision to shelter Hasina effectively transforms her into a hostile political asset operating from foreign territory. For Bangladesh, this is not merely a legal matter but a national security issue. Hasina is no longer a passive fugitive; she is an active threat, giving statements aimed at undermining the interim government and influencing international opinion against Bangladesh. Her presence in Delhi has already strained relations, provoked multiple diplomatic exchanges, and contributed to public pressure within Bangladesh.
If India refuses to act, Bangladesh must consider covert measures to neutralise this threat. This includes options that have been widely used across the region by India itself, as well as other states.
One option is the extraction of Hasina through controlled intelligence operations. Bangladesh’s intelligence agencies have the capability to track her movements, identify vulnerabilities in her security perimeter, and conduct operations designed to capture or relocate her. Such actions would carry risks, but they would also send a powerful message that Bangladesh will not tolerate the harbouring of individuals convicted of crimes against humanity.
Another option is targeted elimination. While such actions fall outside the realm of diplomatic engagement, they are not unprecedented in South Asian intelligence practice. If Hasina continues to orchestrate destabilising activities from Delhi, Bangladesh may conclude that her continued freedom represents an unacceptable threat to national stability.
A third possibility involves a broader intelligence response within India itself. If Delhi refuses to protect Bangladesh’s security concerns, Dhaka may adopt a policy of strategic reciprocity. This could involve counter-operations targeting RAW networks operating against Bangladesh, disruption of Indian influence assets, surveillance of hostile operatives, and pre-emptive neutralisation of threats. India has long assumed that Bangladesh would not engage in such activities. That assumption may no longer hold.
These options are not without risk, but they reflect the reality that a new strategic environment has emerged. India’s refusal to extradite Hasina marks a turning point in how Dhaka must protect its national interests.
The Repercussions for India: A Strategic Miscalculation
India’s decision not to extradite Hasina will carry long-term costs. By shielding a fugitive convicted of crimes against humanity, Delhi undermines its own credibility as a state that claims adherence to the rule of law. This will weaken its standing in international forums, create mistrust among its regional partners, and fuel perceptions that India prioritises political manipulation over legal accountability.
Furthermore, India risks driving Bangladesh towards deeper strategic alignment with China, the Gulf states, and Türkiye. With Hasina removed from power, Bangladesh no longer has a political leadership willing to privilege Indian interests above its own. The interim government, and likely future elected governments, will adopt a far more balanced foreign policy, diminishing India’s traditional leverage.
India also risks escalation into a covert intelligence confrontation. RAW has operated inside Bangladesh with considerable freedom during Hasina’s tenure. That era is over. If India continues to harbour individuals engaged in activities hostile to Bangladesh, Delhi opens the door to its own operatives being targeted, exposed, or neutralised.
The Repercussions for Bangladesh: Strategic Opportunity Amid Constraint
Bangladesh faces its own set of challenges. Managing relations with India remains essential. Dhaka must avoid escalating tensions in ways that disrupt economic stability or regional cooperation. However, India’s refusal to extradite Hasina presents a moment of strategic opportunity. Bangladesh can now re-evaluate its security posture, intelligence doctrine, and regional partnerships without the constraints imposed by Hasina’s pro-India policy orientation.
A more assertive Bangladesh will be able to protect its national interests, secure its sovereignty, and ensure that no external actor interferes in its internal affairs without consequences. This shift will require careful planning, disciplined execution, and a long-term strategic vision. But it marks the beginning of a new era in Bangladesh’s defence and intelligence policy—one shaped not by dependency but by autonomy.
A Defining Moment for Dhaka–Delhi Relations
India will not extradite Sheikh Hasina. This is not a matter of legal complexity but one of political survival for Delhi. The knowledge she carries, the networks she helped sustain, and the covert cooperation she facilitated make her return to Bangladesh an unacceptable risk for Indian interests.
Bangladesh has fulfilled its obligations under international law and bilateral treaty. It has acted responsibly, transparently, and with full respect for due process. The failure lies entirely on the Indian side.
India’s decision will reshape the trajectory of relations between the two countries for years to come. It will compel Bangladesh to strengthen its strategic autonomy, expand its intelligence capabilities, and consider covert options that were previously avoided. It will force Dhaka to reassess its diplomacy, redefine its regional partnerships, and recalibrate its defence posture.
Above all, it signals the end of a political era in which India could expect unwavering compliance from a Bangladeshi government deeply integrated with Indian interests. With that era over, a new strategic landscape emerges—one in which Bangladesh acts not as a client state but as a sovereign actor fully prepared to defend its national interests through diplomatic, legal, or covert means as required.
Khaled Ahmed is a seasoned former intelligence analyst and military expert from the Netherlands, bringing over 15 years of specialised experience in operational intelligence, threat analysis, and strategic defence planning. Having served in high-level, classified roles within Dutch military intelligence, he possesses rare expertise in European security architecture, NATO doctrine, and asymmetric warfare. Khaled’s deep operational insight and international perspective enable him to deliver precision-driven intelligence analysis and forward-looking strategic forecasts. A trusted contributor to high-level risk assessments and security briefings, he offers readers clarity on complex defence and security challenges. Khaled leads the National Security and Fact Analysis sections at BDMilitary. He holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from the University of Groningen, The Netherlands, and is fluent in Dutch, French, and Arabic — combining linguistic dexterity with operational expertise to analyse security issues across cultures and regions.
