India’s eastern airbases have long been portrayed in strategic literature as decisive assets that would enable New Delhi to establish immediate and overwhelming air superiority over Bangladesh in the opening hours of a conflict. Analysts in India frequently assert that the Indian Air Force (IAF), supported by Rafale fighters, S-400 air defence systems, airborne early warning platforms, BrahMos cruise missiles, and a network of northern and eastern-sector air stations, would enjoy a dominant position difficult for Dhaka to counter. This interpretation, however, rests on an outdated understanding of the regional balance of power and a consistent underestimation of the Bangladesh Armed Forces’ evolving strike, air denial, and SEAD/DEAD capabilities. A closer inspection of geography, airbase vulnerability, missile coverage, and emerging force structure reveals a far more contested battlespace—one in which Bangladesh holds credible tools to deny India uncontested access to the air domain.
Strategic misjudgments often arise from a failure to consider modern airpower doctrine. Kazunobu Sakuma, writing for the Air & Space Power Centre, explains that “Contemporary conflict … has revealed new dynamics where denial, parity, and technological innovation define air operations.” In other words, modern air campaigns are increasingly contested, with outright dominance less achievable than planners often assume. For Bangladesh, this perspective aligns perfectly with the country’s emphasis on air denial rather than attempting numerical parity with India. Dhaka’s emerging capabilities reflect a doctrinal understanding that survival and operational disruption can produce strategic effects comparable to total air superiority.
Eastern Indian Airbases: Geography as a Structural Weakness
Unlike in the western theatre—where India enjoys depth, redundancy, and a network of airbases positioned far from hostile borders—the eastern front is compressed into a narrow arc wrapped around Bangladesh. Much of India’s aviation infrastructure lies uncomfortably close to the frontier, especially in West Bengal, Bihar, and Assam. Many of these bases were never designed with modern precision-strike threats in mind, and the geography of the Siliguri Corridor leaves no room for dispersal.
Proximity of Key Indian Airbases to Bangladesh
| Air Force Station (IAF) | State | Approx. Distance to Bangladesh Border | Operational Significance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bagdogra AFS (VEBD) | West Bengal | ~30 km | Siliguri Corridor; key staging base |
| Kalaikunda AFS (VEDX) | West Bengal | ~60 km | Major fighter base |
| Barrackpore AFS (VEBR) | West Bengal | ~75 km | Transport and rotary hub |
| Hasimara AFS (VEHX) | West Bengal | ~80–100 km | Rafale forward base |
| Purnea FBSU (VEPU) | Bihar | ~100 km | Forward Support Unit |
| Guwahati AFS (VEGT) | Assam | ~140–150 km | Major NE hub |
| Panagarh AFS (VIDX) | West Bengal | ~160–180 km | C-130J and special operations |
These distances place the entirety of India’s eastern airpower infrastructure inside the strike envelope of Bangladesh’s growing missile, rocket artillery, and unmanned strike systems. Even the critical Rafale base at Hasimara, often promoted as a game-changer, sits within less than 100 kilometres of the border—far closer than most planners would consider acceptable in modern high-precision warfare.
Why Basing Vulnerability Undermines Air Superiority
Air dominance is frequently misunderstood in public discourse. It is not solely determined by the technological sophistication of aircraft or air defence systems. Rather, the decisive factor is the ability to maintain continuous operational tempo. Runways, fuel depots, ammunition dumps, radar sites, and command nodes must remain functional. If they do not, even superior aircraft become irrelevant.
In the eastern theatre, India’s ability to sustain operations is severely constrained. Bangladesh’s GMLRS systems—including TRG-300/TRG-230 and WS-22—have the precision to crater runways, destroy fuel storage, and disrupt ground operations with minimal expenditure. Short-range ballistic missiles such as Bora, M20, or SY-400 further extend the depth and lethality of these strikes. The effect of even partial damage is multiplicative: runway shutdowns, sortie delays, diverted aircraft, and overstressed logistics. Effects-based operations (EBO), as articulated by Lt. General (ret.) David Deptula, stress that “Effects-based operations put desired strategic effects first and then plan … tactical actions that could achieve the desired effect.” Bangladesh’s approach clearly embodies EBO principles, focusing on denying Indian airpower the operational continuity required for dominance.
Historical precedent reinforces the danger of overconfidence. During modern conflicts in the Gulf and Balkans, air superiority was often contested not by matching aircraft numbers but by targeting the adversary’s infrastructure. Sakuma’s assertion that contemporary conflict prioritizes denial over mere quantity is reflected in Bangladesh’s design of short-range missile coverage, UAV-based ISR, and mobile artillery—all aimed at constraining India’s operational envelope without engaging in large-scale air-to-air battles initially.
Bangladesh’s Precision Strike and Air Defence Evolution
Few Indian analyses account for Bangladesh’s extensive modernisation of its precision-strike ecosystem. Over the past decade, Bangladesh has developed or acquired a layered capability consisting of GMLRS-class rockets with ranges covering every major Indian airbase east of Siliguri, short-range ballistic missiles capable of runway denial, MALE UAVs with ISR, targeting, and strike roles allowing persistent surveillance over airbases and SAM sites, loitering munitions optimized for SEAD and counter-air missions, and dense ground-based air defence networks with radar coverage optimized for terrain and urban clusters.
This network enables Bangladesh not only to defend its own airspace but to impose significant costs on India’s forward-deployed airpower. Crucially, Bangladesh does not need to send aircraft deep into Indian territory; its strike capabilities allow it to neutralize airbases and radar infrastructure from within its own borders or from safe stand-off distances. The result is strategic asymmetry: India must defend multiple forward airbases; Bangladesh needs only to suppress those bases to diminish India’s air advantages. Modern thought on SEAD, as highlighted by the U.S. Air University, emphasizes that SEAD “has become one of air power’s prime enablers … Denial of the SEAD tool—or even diminished emphasis—in modern war would be devastating to the nation’s power projection capability.” Bangladesh’s investment in these capabilities reflects exactly this principle.
Introduction of SEAD/DEAD-Capable Fighters: Eurofighter Typhoon and J-10CE
Bangladesh’s planned induction of the Eurofighter Typhoon and J-10CE represents one of the most important developments in South Asian airpower. These platforms are not merely “new fighters”; they are advanced SEAD/DEAD systems with the electronic warfare capability to challenge India’s premium assets, including the S-400 and forward radar networks. The Typhoon’s advanced electronic attack, sensor fusion, and long-range AAM loadouts give Dhaka a sharp tool for suppressing Indian air defences and neutralising key enablers such as AWACS or aerial refuelling platforms. Meanwhile, the J-10CE’s AESA radar, precision strike compatibility, and agility provide a complementary capability ideal for complex air defence environments. Together, these platforms create the foundation of a true SEAD/DEAD architecture designed to challenge the assumptions of Indian air dominance.
The use of SEAD fighters aligns with Lt. General Deptula’s concept of effects-based operations, focusing on achieving strategic goals by targeting enabling systems rather than purely engaging in attritional combat. General Sir Rupert Smith’s view that “Modern war is primarily about managing risk, not seeking decisive battle” underscores why Bangladesh would adopt such a measured, denial-oriented approach. By focusing on operational disruption and the denial of India’s forward capabilities, Dhaka can impose strategic costs without seeking large-scale aerial engagement.
Erosion of India’s Supposed Advantages
While the Rafale is an exceptional platform, its operational effectiveness depends on secure bases and uninterrupted logistics. If runways, fuel farms, or munitions depots are damaged temporarily, the IAF’s operational tempo slows. Similarly, the S-400 batteries in the east are heavily reliant on functional radars and protected sites; if SEAD/DEAD missions degrade their coverage, their protective effect diminishes. BrahMos launchers, too, can be targeted by long-range artillery and UAV reconnaissance, reducing their tactical impact. In this compressed geography, the assumed technological edge of India becomes less decisive.
Major Simon Mace, referencing Robert Pape, notes that “Denial can work, but strategic bombing is not the best way to achieve it. No strategic bombing campaign has ever yielded decisive results.” This insight aligns directly with Bangladesh’s strategy: operational disruption through airbase denial and radar suppression is far more effective in constraining Indian airpower than seeking high-volume bombing campaigns.
Systemic Blind Spots in Indian Strategic Commentary
Much of India’s public strategic commentary reflects a consistent analytical blind spot: the dismissal of Bangladesh as a serious military actor. Claims that India can “dismember” or “pick apart” Bangladeshi territory overlook Bangladesh’s population of nearly 200 million, its dense defensive grid, hardened installations, urban depth, and modern strike capabilities. Indian narratives often assume Bangladesh will remain static while India strikes freely. In reality, Bangladesh possesses the means to immediately retaliate against India’s forward bases—something Indian analysts rarely incorporate into their models.
The Airpower Balance in a Real Conflict Scenario
A realistic conflict scenario would feature runway and airbase denial, radar and sensor suppression, counter-air and anti-logistics strikes, and a contest for the electromagnetic spectrum. Indian aircraft would face operational constraints, as even temporary runway shutdowns significantly degrade sortie generation. SEAD/DEAD-capable fighters, supported by UAV-based ESM platforms, would attempt to blind S-400 and forward radar coverage. Precision rocket and missile strikes could target aircraft on the ground, fuel storage, and ammunition depots. Electronic warfare would disrupt communications, targeting data, and coordination. Bangladesh’s ability to operate safely from shorter interior lines and repair critical infrastructure quickly provides it a significant advantage in a compressed theatre, while India’s exposed airbases limit operational flexibility.
This scenario reflects Sakuma’s emphasis on denial, parity, and innovation as defining features of modern conflict. Bangladesh’s strategy, incorporating effects-based planning, SEAD/DEAD fighters, precision fires, and UAV ISR, exemplifies a modern, risk-managed approach to airpower contestation, avoiding high-casualty escalation while imposing operational constraints on a larger adversary.
Concluding Remarks
The eastern theatre is a highly contested air domain. Bangladesh’s maturing capabilities in ballistic and guided rockets, MALE UAVs, air defence, and SEAD/DEAD fighters such as Eurofighter Typhoon and J-10CE ensure that India cannot assume uncontested air superiority. Operational tempo, sortie generation, radar resilience, and infrastructure survivability—all critical for modern air dominance—are highly vulnerable along India’s eastern arc. Strategic narratives suggesting easy dominance over Bangladesh reflect political optimism rather than operational reality. The region’s compressed geography, dense population, and layered defensive capabilities create a scenario in which the airpower balance is far more competitive than commonly acknowledged, making careful planning and restraint essential for stability. Integrating modern aerial warfare doctrine—from effects-based operations to denial-focused SEAD—demonstrates how Bangladesh can effectively leverage its compact geography, emerging fighter fleet, and precision strike network to achieve significant strategic leverage in the eastern theatre.
Annex – Comparative Air & Land Assets
| Category | Bangladesh (BAF / Bangladesh Army) | India (IAF / Indian Army – Eastern & Northeastern Commands) |
|---|---|---|
| Primary Combat Aircraft | Eurofighter Typhoon (incoming); J‑10CE (incoming); MiG‑29B/UB (upgraded); F‑7BGI | Su‑30MKI (Tezpur, Chabua, Hasimara); Rafale (Hasimara) |
| Role Specialisation | SEAD/DEAD, air denial, precision strike, electronic attack | Air superiority, multirole, limited strike in Bangladesh-facing theatre |
| BVR Missiles | PL‑15; SD‑10; (Typhoon) Meteor availability limited by export clearance | Meteor (Rafale); Astra Mk‑1; MICA |
| WVR Missiles | PL‑10; A-Darter (planned); R‑73 on MiG‑29 | R‑73; ASRAAM; MICA-IR |
| SEAD/DEAD Weapons | CM‑102 ARM; AR-series precision rockets; SPEAR-EW (future integration) | DRDO EW pods; anti-radiation capability limited (Rafale integration pending) |
| Strike Weapons | C‑802A; GBU-series LGBs; precision glide bombs | BrahMos‑A (limited by load and basing); SAAW; standard LGBs |
| UAVs | TB2 MALE UAVs (ISR + precision strike) | Heron; Searcher ISR (no UCAV capability deployed east) |
| AWACS/AEW&C | None (relies on ground-based radar and passive EW network) | PHALCON and Netra (rotational presence, not permanent) |
| Air Defence (Near-Term) | FM‑90; FK‑3; HQ‑17AE; Hisar‑O+; Siper‑1/2; GDF‑009; CS/AA3; QW‑18A; FN‑16 MANPADS; AESA radar network; passive EW sensors | S‑400 (sector rotation); Akash; Spyder-SR |
| Long-Range SAMs | FM‑90; FK‑3; HQ‑17AE; Hisar‑O+; Siper‑1/2 (deployed/planned) | S‑400 (1–2 firing units rotate through east) |
| Precision Rocket Artillery (MLRS) | WS‑22 (Type C); TRG‑300/230 (Type B); guided rockets | Pinaka Mk‑I (limited presence); BM‑21 Grad |
| SRBM / Tactical Missiles | Bora / M20 / SY‑400 (Type A SRBMs, 280–400 km) | Pralay SRBM (not widely deployed east); Prahaar (limited) |
| Artillery (Tube) | 155 mm SPH; 122 mm MLRS; divisional artillery on all fronts | 130 mm & 155 mm towed guns (terrain-limited) |
| Counter‑Air Capability on Land | GMLRS brigades; dispersed radar; mobile AD units | Static and semi-mobile AD; limited counter-SEAD resilience |
| Relevant Ground Forces | 11th, 17th, 19th, 55th, 66th Infantry Divisions; Para‑Commando Brigade | 20 Mountain Division; 3 Corps elements; 57 Mountain Division (China-facing forces excluded) |
| Operational Advantages | Proximity to Indian airbases; layered GMLRS/SRBM coverage; SEAD-optimised air fleet; modern, integrated AD network | Numerical superiority nationally; AWACS rotation; some high-end fighters in theatre |
| Operational Vulnerabilities | No deployed long-range AWACS; depends on SEAD to neutralise Indian airpower | Forward airbases within 50–150 km of Bangladesh strike envelope; mountain-oriented units |
Khaled Ahmed is a seasoned former intelligence analyst and military expert from the Netherlands, bringing over 15 years of specialised experience in operational intelligence, threat analysis, and strategic defence planning. Having served in high-level, classified roles within Dutch military intelligence, he possesses rare expertise in European security architecture, NATO doctrine, and asymmetric warfare. Khaled’s deep operational insight and international perspective enable him to deliver precision-driven intelligence analysis and forward-looking strategic forecasts. A trusted contributor to high-level risk assessments and security briefings, he offers readers clarity on complex defence and security challenges. Khaled leads the National Security and Fact Analysis sections at BDMilitary. He holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from the University of Groningen, The Netherlands, and is fluent in Dutch, French, and Arabic — combining linguistic dexterity with operational expertise to analyse security issues across cultures and regions.
