The emphatic victory of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) in the general election of 12 February marks a watershed moment in Dhaka’s strategic trajectory. Emerging from nearly two decades in political limbo after the July–August 2024 uprising, the party now faces the immediate challenge of honouring a series of defence procurement commitments that straddle competing geopolitical interests.
The interim government under Nobel laureate Dr Mohammed Yunus — which stewarded the transition following the collapse of the Awami League administration — pursued an assertive and outward-looking defence strategy. Throughout 2025 and into early 2026, Dhaka engaged with partners from China, the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, Pakistan, Türkiye and other Western nations to secure advanced military hardware, ranging from combat aircraft and missile systems to warships, submarines and unmanned platforms. This broad engagement reflects an urgent desire to modernise Bangladesh’s forces and build credible deterrence against diverse threats.
The BNP’s own manifesto places defence and border security at the forefront of its national priorities. It emphasises the development of a strong, modern and professional armed force, enhanced maritime security in the Bay of Bengal, improved border surveillance capabilities, and the strengthening of air defence and cyber warfare capacity. The party has also underscored the importance of formulating a comprehensive national security strategy and institutionalising long-term defence planning to ensure continuity and sustainability.
Yet the most delicate dimension of the incoming government’s defence agenda will be managing the intensifying competition between major powers — particularly between China and the United States.
Washington has signalled increasing interest in providing Bangladesh with alternatives to Chinese defence equipment. In the broader context of Indo-Pacific strategic competition, the United States views Bangladesh as a significant maritime and geopolitical actor. American defence offerings — whether in the form of surveillance systems, maritime domain awareness platforms, advanced aircraft, or precision munitions — could undoubtedly add qualitative value to Bangladesh’s force structure. US systems are often technologically sophisticated, interoperable with Western platforms, and backed by high training standards and logistical frameworks.
However, while the United States can complement Bangladesh’s defence modernisation, it is unlikely to replace China as Dhaka’s primary source of major military hardware.
For decades, China has served as Bangladesh’s principal defence supplier, not merely because of affordability, but due to the structure of its defence partnerships. Beijing offers staggered payment arrangements, soft loans, and government-to-government financing mechanisms that are particularly attractive to developing economies managing fiscal constraints. More significantly, China has demonstrated willingness to engage in transfer of technology, local assembly arrangements, and industrial collaboration — areas where Western suppliers, including the United States, tend to impose stricter controls.
The question is therefore not whether Bangladesh should choose between Washington and Beijing. Rather, it is how Dhaka can prudently integrate US-origin systems into a force structure that remains predominantly Chinese-equipped, without creating logistical fragmentation or political dependency.
The BNP’s stated doctrine of “Friend Yes, Master No” will be tested most visibly in this sphere. A diversified procurement policy enhances strategic autonomy, but over-correction in either direction risks undermining operational coherence. The reality is that China’s financial flexibility, speed of delivery, and openness to technology transfer provide advantages that the United States cannot easily match under its current export and regulatory frameworks.
At the same time, selective acquisition of American or Western systems — particularly in high-end ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance), maritime security, and niche technologies — could strengthen Bangladesh’s overall capability and signal a balanced foreign policy posture.
The BNP government must therefore pursue a layered approach: preserve and honour existing Chinese partnerships, deepen indigenous capacity through technology absorption, and selectively incorporate Western systems where they offer clear operational advantage. Such a model would avoid dependency while maximising capability.
Bangladesh’s defence policy should not become an arena for great-power rivalry. Instead, it must remain anchored in national interest, fiscal realism and long-term strategic planning. Hardware procurement is ultimately a means, not an end. The true objective is a self-reliant, credible and professionally managed defence establishment capable of safeguarding sovereignty in an increasingly complex regional environment.
The BNP now carries both a mandate and a responsibility. Balancing continuity with diversification — without compromising autonomy will define whether this new chapter in Bangladesh’s defence policy becomes a success story or a cautionary tale.
Ayesha Farid is a regional security specialist focusing on South Asia, with over a decade of experience analysing inter-state tensions, cross-border insurgency, and regional power dynamics. She has worked with leading policy think tanks and academic institutions, offering nuanced insights into the complex security challenges shaping the subcontinent. Ayesha’s expertise spans military doctrines, border disputes, and regional cooperation frameworks, making her a vital contributor to BDMilitary’s coverage of South Asian strategic affairs. She leads the Geopolitics & Diplomacy section at BDMilitary. Ayesha holds a dual master’s degree — a Master in International Relations from the IE School of Politics, Economics & Global Affairs, Spain, and a Master of Public Policy from the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto, Canada — combining deep academic insight with practical policy expertise.
