Assessment Report: Viability of Indian Heavy Weapon Deployment in Bangladesh Theatre

This report presents a detailed evaluation of the feasibility and implications of deploying Indian Army heavy weapons within the territory of Bangladesh in the event of a military confrontation. The assessment is informed by a comprehensive analysis of terrain characteristics, the composition and capabilities of both military forces, and emerging technologies in precision strike, anti-armour warfare, and unmanned aerial systems.

In recent years, the Bangladesh Army has undertaken a strategic modernisation effort under the framework of its Forces Goal 2030 programme. This has resulted in the acquisition of advanced long-range artillery systems, modern anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), armed and ISR-capable drones, and highly mobile infantry units trained for rapid manoeuvre in restrictive terrain. These advancements have significantly increased the country’s deterrence posture, particularly against conventional mechanised offensives.

Conversely, the Indian Army continues to maintain a doctrinal emphasis on large-scale armoured and combined arms formations, supported by extensive artillery and air-ground coordination. However, much of its conventional warfighting equipment—such as the Arjun, T-90, and T-72 main battle tanks—are optimised for the open plains of Punjab and Rajasthan, or the plateau of Ladakh, rather than the complex deltaic environment of Bangladesh.

The intent of this report is to assess the military feasibility of such a deployment by the Indian Army, identify critical vulnerabilities, and evaluate the strategic effectiveness of Indian assets when confronted with Bangladesh’s geography and its developing layered-defence capabilities.

This report evaluates the viability of the Indian Army deploying and operating major heavy weapons within Bangladesh in the event of a military confrontation. The assessment draws upon terrain analysis, military balance, and the impact of Bangladesh’s expanding anti-tank, drone, and artillery capabilities.

Conclusion: The Indian Army would face substantial operational and strategic limitations in deploying heavy weapons within Bangladesh due to terrain unsuitability and Bangladesh’s growing capability to deny and interdict mechanised advances using modern anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), armed UAVs, and long-range guided rocket artillery (GMLRS).

Terrain Limitations in Bangladesh

Bangladesh’s geography presents significant obstacles to the deployment and manoeuvre of heavy weapons:

• Deltaic, Alluvial Terrain: The country is predominantly riverine, with soft soil that restricts the mobility of main battle tanks (MBTs) and self-propelled artillery.
• Seasonal Flooding: The monsoon season exacerbates mobility challenges, rendering many rural roads impassable and softening terrain for prolonged periods.
• Narrow Roads and Dense Infrastructure: Urbanised and densely populated areas, along with limited road widths, inhibit the movement and concealment of heavy armoured columns.
• Limited Bridge Load Ratings: Many of Bangladesh’s rural bridges are not rated to support MBTs such as the Arjun (~70 tonnes) or T-90S (~46.5 tonnes).

Indian Heavy Weapons and Mobility Constraints

Weapon System	Weight	Deployment Viability in Bangladesh
Arjun Mk1/Mk1A	~68–70 tonnes	Extremely limited – likely unsuitable for use due to excessive weight.
T-90S Bhishma	~46.5 tonnes	Limited – feasible only in selected sectors with robust infrastructure.
T-72M1	~41 tonnes	Moderately viable – more mobile than Arjun and T-90 but still constrained by bridge weight limits and soft terrain.
BMP-2 IFV	~14 tonnes	Highly mobile – suitable for limited mechanised operations.
Pinaka MRL	~13 tonnes (launcher vehicle)	Mobile but outranged by Bangladeshi equivalents.

Bangladesh’s Deterrent Capabilities

Bangladesh has made strategic investments in defensive capabilities optimised for its terrain:

Anti-Tank Systems

• Metis-M1 (Russia): ~2 km range, tandem warhead capable of defeating ERA-protected armour.
• HJ-8 / Baktar-Shikan (China/Pakistan): ~4 km range, effective against T-72s and side/rear of T-90s.
• Alcotán-100 (Spain): Disposable rocket launcher with tandem warhead; highly portable.
• PF-98 (China): Man-portable AT launcher with fire control system; ~800 mm RHA penetration.

These systems enable highly effective defensive ambushes in confined spaces and urban chokepoints.

UAV Capabilities

• Bayraktar TB2 (Türkiye): Long-endurance, precision-strike UAV capable of neutralising armoured and artillery targets at 15+ km.
• ISR and Targeting Integration: Enhances responsiveness and precision of artillery strikes.

Long-Range Artillery and GMLRS

• Nora B-52K1 (Serbia): Self-propelled 155 mm howitzer capable of firing laser-guided munitions and extended-range rounds.
• TRG-230 (Türkiye): 20–70 km range, high accuracy with satellite guidance; widely deployed.
• TRG-300 Tiger (Türkiye): 120 km range with significant payload capacity; effective against enemy artillery and logistics.
• WS-22 (China): Modular system upgraded to fire WS-32 (150 km) and WS-43 loitering munitions.
• Prospective Acquisition – Khan / Type A (Turkey): 280–300 km range tactical ballistic/GMLRS system, aligning with Future Forces Goal 2030 roadmap.

Bangladesh’s artillery forces are thus capable of out-ranging and pre-empting Indian fire support concentrations near or across the border.

Indian Vulnerabilities in a Conflict Scenario

Vulnerability	Explanation
Armoured Concentrations	Vulnerable to ATGM and drone strikes in confined or urban terrain.
Artillery & Fire Bases	Within range of Bangladeshi GMLRS; poor strategic depth in some sectors.
Logistics & Supply Lines	Highly exposed due to limited road/bridge infrastructure and lack of concealment.
Command & Control Nodes	Susceptible to ISR-directed precision strikes via UAVs and guided munitions.
Air Superiority	Contested in a drone-rich environment; effective denial possible using MANPADS.

Strategic Implications

India’s traditional advantages in mass and firepower would be heavily mitigated by the following factors:

• Bangladesh’s longer-range precision fires (GMLRS) create a stand-off advantage.
• Modern ATGMs and UAVs impose high attrition on advancing forces.
• Terrain restricts mechanised manoeuvre and neutralises MBT mobility.
• Urban and semi-urban areas favour the defender.

India would thus be compelled to consider:

• Special Forces deployment sparingly due to their limited numbers and high operational cost.
• Light infantry forces, while numerous, would face disadvantages against better trained and increasingly well-equipped Bangladeshi infantry units operating on familiar ground.
• Mechanised infantry with BMPs or wheeled APCs would be highly vulnerable to Bangladesh’s extensive network of ATGM kill zones and ambush chokepoints.
• Precision artillery and long-range strikes from within Indian territory could offer limited tactical utility but remain vulnerable to counter-battery and drone ISR.
• ISR and EW platforms may mitigate Bangladesh’s UAV edge, assuming timely deployment and operational coherence.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Indian Army would be unable to effectively deploy and sustain major heavy weapon formations inside Bangladesh in the face of the country’s:

• Challenging terrain and mobility restrictions,
• Well-integrated and mobile anti-tank defences,
• Modern UAV strike and surveillance capability,
• Precision-guided long-range artillery that outranges Indian assets.

Bangladesh has, through targeted investments, created a layered and credible area-denial architecture that significantly complicates any large-scale offensive by conventional Indian forces.