The attempted assassination of Sharif Osman Hadi has brought new urgency to discussions about political security, foreign influence, and intelligence operations inside Bangladesh. It is an event that has inflamed public debate, triggered speculation across social and print media, and raised important questions about Bangladesh’s vulnerability to hybrid threats. Using information circulating publicly—including the December 2024 Home Ministry note referenced earlier—this analysis aims to contextualise the event in a broader defence-intelligence frame. It does not endorse any specific allegation but rather examines how such claims arise, how they fit into known operational patterns, and what systemic weaknesses made such an attack possible.
Sharif Osman Hadi: Identity, Influence, and the Making of a Target
While not a mainstream establishment figure, Sharif Osman Hadi represents a new type of political actor in Bangladesh—those whose influence is rooted more in grassroots networks, digital communication, and local activism than formal party hierarchies. In an era where social media has become a parallel arena of electoral mobilisation, individuals like Hadi wield disproportionate influence over public sentiment relative to their formal political rank.
Hadi’s activism, his public engagements, and the perception that he stands outside rigid party structures make him an uncomplicated but symbolically potent figure in Bangladesh’s current political climate. He appeals particularly to younger demographics disillusioned with traditional political dynamics. Such individuals often attract considerable attention from both supporters and rivals, especially during election periods.
This very visibility, paradoxically, increases vulnerability. In environments where political actors lack institutional protection, individuals who rise too quickly—without alignment to entrenched networks—may be perceived as disruptive. That disruption need not be national in scale. At the constituency level, even subtle shifts in influence can produce incentives for coercion, intimidation, or violent suppression.
The Landscape of Opposition: Domestic Rivals, Foreign Interests, and Perceived Beneficiaries
An attack on any political figure naturally prompts questions about potential beneficiaries, both domestic and external. These questions do not imply guilt; rather, they are part of a standard analytical process used worldwide in assessing political violence, especially in regions with contested political environments.
Domestic Parties and the Logic of Local Power
Bangladesh’s political ecosystem is dominated by two rival blocs: the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Their rivalry is intense and often zero-sum, extending deep into local politics. In such an environment, independent or non-aligned political actors may unintentionally threaten the influence structures of either party, whether by mobilising alternative constituencies, interfering in established patronage networks, or altering expected electoral arithmetic.
Although no verified evidence implicates either major party directly, analysts recognise that in many competitive electoral environments worldwide, mid-level actors—rather than national leaders—are sometimes targeted because they shift local balances of power at critical moments. This is not unique to Bangladesh; it is a global phenomenon observed in numerous political systems with high degrees of localised competition.
The Foreign Dimension and Allegations Circulating in Public Discourse
The geopolitical context cannot be ignored. Public debate in Bangladesh frequently speculates about regional intelligence agencies, particularly India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). Some individuals—such as Zulkarnaen Saer—have publicly alleged that RAW may have had a role in the attempted attack. These claims remain allegations only, but they reflect widespread perceptions regarding Indian influence in Bangladesh’s political affairs.
To understand why such claims gain traction, analysts often examine the operational cultures of intelligence agencies in South Asia. RAW, widely described in academic literature as a civilian foreign intelligence service with a flexible operational methodology, is sometimes associated with influence operations that rely on intermediaries, including non-state actors. These portrayals have been shaped partly by contentious cases abroad, such as allegations regarding Sikh dissidents in Canada. While the facts of those cases remain legally and politically disputed, they nonetheless feed into a broader public narrative in Bangladesh that views Indian intelligence activity with suspicion.
It is crucial to emphasise that no open-source evidence confirms RAW’s involvement in the attack on Hadi. The claims exist within the realm of political discourse, not proven attribution. Yet, the persistence of such allegations underscores a deep-seated perception of Bangladesh as an arena where regional powers exert influence—real or imagined.
Operational Analysis: How Such an Attack Could Occur
Regardless of who might have planned the attack, the operational circumstances bear hallmarks commonly observed in political violence across South Asia.
Understanding the Targeting Process
Political assassinations or assassination attempts typically follow a predictable structure:
- Target Selection – The individual is identified as valuable because of symbolic power, local influence, or potential to disrupt established networks.
- Vulnerability Assessment – The attacker identifies gaps in the target’s routine, security detail, travel arrangements, or public interactions.
- Surveillance and Reconnaissance – Operational actors observe the target over days or weeks to map out patterns.
- Recruitment of Local Assets – This can include criminal groups, political musclemen, or loosely affiliated individuals incentivised by payment or protection.
- Execution Phase – Carried out during moments of maximum exposure, such as rallies or public gatherings.
- Exit and Cover – Often protected by chaos, crowd density, political confusion, or pre-arranged escape routes.
In Bangladesh, this pattern is made easier by the inherent nature of political campaigning. Candidates often must interact closely with the public; they lack secure vehicles, professional bodyguards, or protected staging points. Large crowds are a double-edged sword—valuable for political mobilisation but extremely dangerous from a protective-security standpoint.
The Role of Criminal Intermediaries
Bangladesh, like many countries with dense urban centres and politically affiliated patronage systems, has a complex relationship between politics and local muscle networks. This environment gives external actors—if any exist—fertile ground to recruit operational intermediaries who understand local terrain, social hierarchies, and escape routes.
If an external intelligence service were hypothetically involved, it would likely rely on precisely these kinds of intermediaries. This method offers deniability, cost efficiency, and operational camouflage. Likewise, domestic political actors—again hypothetically—would find such networks accessible and reliable.
However, without verified evidence, these remain analytical possibilities, not proven facts.
Table 1: Hypothetical Operational Requirements for an Attack
| Operational Component | Typical Requirements in South Asian Contexts | Relevance to Hadi Case (Analytical, Not Attributive) |
|---|---|---|
| Target Surveillance | Local reconnaissance teams; community knowledge | High – Hadi’s public visibility made tracking easy |
| Logistics | Access to transport, weapons, safe houses | Possible through local networks |
| Deniability | Use of intermediaries and criminal actors | Alleged in public discourse |
| Political Cover | Turbulent election atmosphere | Present during timeline |
| Exit Strategy | Congested urban environment exploited | Consistent with Bangladesh conditions |
What the Home Ministry Document Suggests
A key part of this analysis comes from the December 2024 Home Ministry note referenced earlier. The document, as interpreted publicly, appears to outline warnings regarding:
- Potential foreign-sponsored subversion
- Destabilising operations
- Attacks designed to spread fear or disrupt social harmony
- Vulnerability to hybrid warfare tactics
- Disinformation and psychological operations
- Targets chosen to incite political confusion
This document indicates that the government was aware of a general threat environment, rather than specific plots against individual figures. Yet the critical failure was the inability to translate these warnings into protective practices. Recognition of vulnerability is not the same as mitigating it.
Intelligence Cultures in South Asia: Understanding the Context
Bangladesh does not exist in a geopolitical vacuum. It is situated between two nuclear-armed rivals—India and Pakistan—whose intelligence agencies have shaped regional security dynamics for decades. Understanding their operational cultures helps contextualise public speculation.
RAW: A Civilian Service with a Wide Operational Spectrum
India’s Research and Analysis Wing is structurally different from military intelligence agencies. It is staffed largely by police cadres and civilian officers. Academic writings often characterise it as flexible, politically attuned, and capable of using clandestine channels, including non-state actors, to achieve strategic objectives. These portrayals—whether accurate or not—shape how regional events are interpreted by observers in Bangladesh.
DGFI: Bangladesh’s Military Intelligence Wing
Bangladesh’s Directorate General of Forces Intelligence is more hierarchical, more formalised, and often more focused on national security rather than political manipulation. However, its influence within the state apparatus gives it significant monitoring capabilities.
ISI: Pakistan’s Well-Known Hybrid Service
Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency has long been associated with HUMINT-heavy operations, proxy networks, and deep involvement in regional political affairs. Its historical ties to Bangladesh prior to 1971 add to the complexity of public perceptions.
None of these regional intelligence services can be conclusively linked to the Hadi incident. What matters for analysis is understanding why, in the public imagination, such agencies appear as potential actors whenever political violence occurs in Bangladesh.
Table 2: Comparative Traits of Regional Intelligence Agencies
| Agency | Structural Nature | Publicly Discussed Operational Traits | Public Perceptions in Bangladesh |
|---|---|---|---|
| RAW (India) | Civilian foreign intelligence | Influence operations, political penetration, use of intermediaries | Often suspected of interference |
| DGFI (Bangladesh) | Military intelligence | Internal security, counterterrorism, monitoring | Seen as guardian of state interests |
| ISI (Pakistan) | Military-civil hybrid | HUMINT, proxy warfare, regional operations | Viewed with historical suspicion |
Systemic Vulnerabilities: Why the Attack Was Possible
No matter who may have planned or executed the attack, Bangladesh’s structural weaknesses made it possible. These vulnerabilities stem from institutional, political, and resource-driven issues that have persisted for years.
Lack of Formal Candidate Protection
Bangladesh has no standardised system of election-time protection for political candidates, regardless of party affiliation. While ruling party leaders often receive security details, opposition and independent figures rarely do. This creates a tiered system of vulnerability.
Fragmentation of Intelligence
Multiple agencies—DGFI, NSI, SB, CID, RAB Intelligence—operate without a unified fusion centre or real-time threat-sharing mechanism. Threat information often remains compartmentalised, slowing response.
Overstretched Police Infrastructure
Local police struggle with manpower shortages, budget limitations, and political pressures. In many districts, officers cannot provide meaningful security to candidates or public rallies.
Politicisation of Security Priorities
Polarisation between the two major parties means that:
- Opponents may distrust state protection
- Some threats are downplayed due to political bias
- Violence is sometimes attributed reflexively to political rivals, hindering clear investigation
These challenges form an ecosystem in which targeted violence becomes not only possible, but in some cases, predictable.
The Perception Battlefield: Zulkarnaen Saer’s Claims
Zulkarnaen Saer’s public assertions about RAW’s involvement have played a role in shaping the discussion around the attempted assassination. It is essential to state clearly that these claims are not verified evidence. They represent one perspective, influenced by political interpretation, personal conviction, and geopolitical sentiment.
Nonetheless, in the study of hybrid warfare and psychological operations, perception becomes a weapon. Even unverified allegations influence public behaviour, political dynamics, and diplomatic atmospheres. The fact that such claims resonate widely in Bangladesh highlights a deep-rooted distrust of external actors and reflects the country’s longstanding anxiety about sovereignty and interference.
Analysts must therefore study these claims not as factual statements but as sociopolitical indicators. They reveal how Bangladeshis interpret threats, how narratives of foreign involvement circulate, and how fear shapes public discourse.
The Government’s Acknowledged Awareness: A Missed Opportunity
The December 2024 Home Ministry document demonstrates that the government was conscious of several ongoing risks—attacks on political figures, foreign subversion narratives, social destabilisation attempts, and targeted violence. Despite this, the state’s protective mechanisms failed to prevent the attempted assassination.
The reasons are structural rather than personal.
Institutional Overload
Election periods generate demand for security far exceeding national capacity. Large rallies, high emotional tension, and widespread political mobilisation stretch every unit of the internal security apparatus.
Resource Scarcity
Protective operations require trained personnel, secure transport, intelligence coordination, and surveillance equipment. Bangladesh has made improvements, but deficiencies remain, especially outside major cities.
Lack of Prioritisation
State protection is often allocated based on political alignment rather than objective risk assessment. Independent candidates fall outside the priority list, leaving them exposed despite clear indications of general threat.
Disjuncture Between Intelligence and Action
The Home Ministry document may reflect a familiar problem: analysis does not always translate into operational planning. This is common in many developing states where bureaucratic inertia, political pressures, and inter-agency rivalry hinder swift action.
Wider Implications: Political Security and State Stability
The attempt on Hadi’s life is not an isolated incident but part of a broader set of conditions that challenge Bangladesh’s stability. It reflects a pattern of risk that could worsen if not addressed.
The attack illustrates several structural realities:
- Political actors without institutional backing are highly vulnerable.
- Crowd-dependent electioneering remains a serious security hazard.
- Regional intelligence rivalries contribute to public suspicion and geopolitical anxiety.
- Bangladesh’s internal security architecture requires modernisation.
- Public perception of foreign interference can inflame political tensions even without evidence.
These factors underscore the importance of developing a more resilient political-security framework that can withstand both internal volatility and external pressure.
Table 3: Structural Factors Contributing to Vulnerability
| Category | Contributing Factors | Implications |
|---|---|---|
| Institutional | Fragmented intelligence, weak candidate protection, resource scarcity | Increased risk of targeted attacks |
| Political | Polarisation, patronage networks, distrust of state institutions | Heightened conflict during elections |
| Social | Crowded rallies, mass mobilisation, emotional volatility | Easier conditions for attackers |
| Geopolitical | Suspicion of foreign involvement, regional rivalry | Amplified political tension |
Towards a New Security Doctrine for Bangladesh
To prevent future incidents, Bangladesh will need to modernise its approach to electoral and political security. This requires institutional reform, professionalisation of protective services, and depoliticisation of intelligence operations.
Establishing an Election Security Framework
Bangladesh would benefit from a system where all candidates—regardless of party—receive:
- Pre-election threat assessments
- Basic protective guidelines
- Access to liaison officers
- Standard emergency protocols
Such measures exist in several democracies and could be adapted for Bangladesh’s context.
Building Intelligence Fusion Capacity
An integrated fusion centre connecting DGFI, NSI, Special Branch, and RAB would:
- Enable real-time threat sharing
- Reduce duplication
- Improve situational awareness
This would help bridge the gap between warning and action.
Professionalising Candidate Protection
Training programmes could be introduced for:
- Crowd management
- Route planning
- Personal security awareness
Candidates should also receive guidelines on avoiding predictable routines and identifying suspicious behaviour in large gatherings.
Promoting Investigative Transparency
To avoid unrestrained speculation, politically sensitive cases should be investigated transparently. This could include independent commissions or oversight by judicial bodies. Transparency improves public trust and reduces the space for misinformation.
Conclusion
The attempted assassination of Sharif Osman Hadi exposes the vulnerabilities within Bangladesh’s political and security landscape. While allegations of foreign involvement—particularly the widely discussed claims regarding RAW—continue to circulate, none of these assertions have been substantiated by concrete evidence. They remain part of political discourse, shaped by public sentiment, historical mistrust, and regional geopolitical dynamics.
What is certain, however, is that Bangladesh’s internal environment—characterised by polarisation, inadequate candidate protection, fragmented intelligence operations, and resource limitations—created the conditions for such an attack to occur. Understanding these structural weaknesses is far more important than pursuing unverified claims.
The state must respond by modernising its security mechanisms, institutionalising protective measures for political actors, and fostering transparency in investigations. Without these reforms, Bangladesh risks further violence, deeper polarisation, and the continued manipulation of public perception by both domestic and external actors.
The attempted assassination is a warning. Whether the country can learn from it will determine the stability of its political future.
Khaled Ahmed is a seasoned former intelligence analyst and military expert from the Netherlands, bringing over 15 years of specialised experience in operational intelligence, threat analysis, and strategic defence planning. Having served in high-level, classified roles within Dutch military intelligence, he possesses rare expertise in European security architecture, NATO doctrine, and asymmetric warfare. Khaled’s deep operational insight and international perspective enable him to deliver precision-driven intelligence analysis and forward-looking strategic forecasts. A trusted contributor to high-level risk assessments and security briefings, he offers readers clarity on complex defence and security challenges. Khaled leads the National Security and Fact Analysis sections at BDMilitary. He holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from the University of Groningen, The Netherlands, and is fluent in Dutch, French, and Arabic — combining linguistic dexterity with operational expertise to analyse security issues across cultures and regions.
