The nomination of Brent Christensen as the next United States Ambassador to Bangladesh has once again brought the subject of defence cooperation between the two countries into focus. During his Senate hearing, Christensen emphasised the need to deepen military-to-military ties and counter China’s growing influence in South Asia, particularly in Bangladesh. His remarks were well-intentioned, yet they exposed a recurring flaw in Washington’s approach: the tendency to view Bangladesh purely through the prism of great-power competition.
For any meaningful defence partnership to develop, the United States must understand that Bangladesh’s defence priorities are shaped not by ideology, but by geography, affordability, and strategic autonomy. Unless American policymakers start addressing Dhaka’s actual security needs rather than expecting it to fit into a pre-defined Indo-Pacific framework, talk of a “stronger partnership” will remain rhetoric rather than reality.
Bangladesh’s Strategic Context: Geography Over Geopolitics
Since independence, Bangladesh’s security priorities have been defined by its geography. The country shares over 4,000 kilometres of border with India, faces persistent non-traditional threats along its frontiers, and must safeguard an Exclusive Economic Zone of more than 118,000 square kilometres in the Bay of Bengal. Its strategic challenges include border management, maritime surveillance, airspace protection, and disaster response.
Contrary to Washington’s assumptions, Bangladesh’s security outlook is India-centric, not China-centric. The country’s defence modernisation has been aimed at ensuring credible deterrence and operational readiness vis-à-vis its immediate neighbour, rather than preparing for a contest between superpowers. Any external partnership that does not recognise this strategic reality will fail to resonate in Dhaka.
China as a Supplier: A Transactional Relationship
China has, over the past two decades, become Bangladesh’s principal source of military hardware. The Bangladesh Armed Forces operate a wide array of Chinese-origin systems, including F-7BG and K-8W aircraft, Type-053H3 frigates, Type-035G submarines, MBT-2000 tanks, and FM-90 surface-to-air missile systems. Beijing’s advantage lies in its affordability, financing flexibility, and willingness to transfer technology—terms that Western suppliers rarely offer.
Importantly, Bangladesh’s defence cooperation with China is transactional, not ideological. Beijing provides platforms and support without political interference or conditionality. By contrast, U.S. offers often come with end-use monitoring clauses, inspection rights, and restrictions that limit operational independence. The suggestion that Bangladesh should accept refurbished F-16s fitted with kill switches and intrusive oversight mechanisms is both unrealistic and politically tone-deaf. For a country that values sovereignty, such offers are non-starters.
The ACSA and GSOMIA Question
Washington has been keen for Dhaka to sign two foundational defence agreements: the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) and the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). While standard among U.S. defence partners, these frameworks are viewed with caution in Bangladesh. Signing them would risk signalling alignment with the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, which Dhaka perceives as indirectly confrontational towards China.
Bangladesh’s foreign policy is rooted in its founding doctrine—“Friendship to all, malice toward none.” The country has no interest in entering into arrangements that could compromise its non-aligned posture or its ability to maintain balanced relations with all major powers. Therefore, while Dhaka remains open to cooperation, it will not accept agreements that come at the cost of its strategic flexibility.
Washington’s Current Approach: Symbolism Without Substance
If Washington believes it can shift Bangladesh’s defence orientation by offering token platforms, training exchanges, or refurbished aircraft, it is misreading the situation entirely. Dhaka’s Forces Goal 2030 clearly defines its modernisation priorities:
- Acquisition of next-generation multirole fighter aircraft for credible air defence;
- Development of long-endurance UAVs for maritime and border surveillance;
- Expansion of strategic airlift and rotary-wing capabilities for logistics and disaster relief;
- Enhancement of naval and special operations units for maritime security.
Unless the United States offers solutions that address these core requirements, its influence in Bangladesh’s defence calculus will remain minimal.
A Practical Path Forward
A realistic U.S.–Bangladesh defence partnership must be based on mutual utility rather than political expectation. Washington should not seek to replace China as Dhaka’s supplier but to complement Bangladesh’s capabilities in critical areas.
One of the most viable steps would be for the United States to support Bangladesh’s procurement of the Eurofighter Typhoon through European channels. The Typhoon offers a balance of capability, independence, and interoperability. As several of its subsystems and munitions rely on American technology, U.S. export approval is essential. Facilitating rather than obstructing this process would show that Washington is serious about helping Dhaka diversify its procurement sources without forcing alignment.
Another area of cooperation could be advanced unmanned aerial systems for maritime and border security. Bangladesh’s coastline and maritime zones are vast, and its surveillance capabilities remain limited. Providing long-endurance UAVs or smaller tactical drones equipped with maritime radar and electro-optical sensors would substantially enhance situational awareness in the Bay of Bengal and along the Myanmar frontier. These could be delivered through Foreign Military Financing (FMF) or grant programmes under the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy—initiatives that would benefit both nations.
Similarly, airlift and rotary-wing support is another domain of immediate utility. The Bangladesh Air Force and Army Aviation Wings are heavily involved in humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and UN peacekeeping missions. The provision of transport aircraft such as the C-130J Super Hercules or refurbished heavy-lift helicopters like the CH-47 Chinook, combined with logistics and maintenance support, would directly strengthen operational readiness and mobility without political complications.
Bangladesh’s geographic position and maritime expansion also justify the development of a dedicated Marine Brigade. U.S. advisory and training assistance could help raise and equip this force, enabling it to protect offshore installations and island territories more effectively. Additionally, the Special Warfare Diving and Salvage (SWADS) unit of the Bangladesh Navy would greatly benefit from American training and equipment upgrades. Building these units’ capacity aligns directly with U.S. interests in maritime security and counter-smuggling operations in the Bay of Bengal.
Beyond Equipment: Building Institutional Linkages
Defence cooperation must go beyond the supply of hardware. Joint training programmes, military education exchanges, and collaboration in maritime domain awareness and coast guard interoperability would provide sustainable, low-risk pathways for deeper engagement. These activities also strengthen professional ties between the armed forces—an investment that yields dividends long after specific deals conclude.
However, Washington must recognise that perception matters. U.S. credibility in the Muslim world has been weakened by its perceived inconsistency in the Middle East and its close alignment with India. If American engagement in Dhaka is seen as one-sided or coercive, it will not succeed. Only a relationship based on respect, equality, and shared benefit will endure.
Bangladesh’s Strategic Balance Will Remain Intact
Bangladesh’s defence doctrine is built on balance. It will not choose between the United States and China, nor between India and any other power. Its strategy is to derive the best possible terms from all partners while maintaining full freedom of action. U.S. policymakers should therefore focus not on displacing China, but on identifying complementary roles—areas where American technology, training, or expertise can add value without political strings attached.
Washington must also accept that Dhaka’s cooperation with China will continue in certain sectors, just as it will pursue partnerships with Turkey, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The aim should be to make the United States a reliable, alternative source of capability, not an intrusive overseer demanding exclusivity.
The Test of Realism
Brent Christensen’s tenure in Dhaka will test whether the United States can finally move from rhetoric to realism in its approach to Bangladesh. The window for effective engagement is open, but it requires humility, flexibility, and a clear understanding of Dhaka’s priorities.
Bangladesh does not reject partnership with the United States—it rejects conditions that undermine its autonomy. If Washington can align its offers with Bangladesh’s actual security needs—by supporting the Eurofighter programme, providing UAVs and airlift platforms, and assisting in the development of marine and special operations capabilities—it can build a durable and mutually beneficial relationship.
But if it continues to rely on outdated platforms, restrictive agreements, and geopolitical lectures, Bangladesh will simply continue to deepen its cooperation with those willing to listen and deliver. Real partnerships are not dictated; they are built through respect, realism, and relevance.
Khaled Ahmed is a seasoned former intelligence analyst and military expert from the Netherlands, bringing over 15 years of specialised experience in operational intelligence, threat analysis, and strategic defence planning. Having served in high-level, classified roles within Dutch military intelligence, he possesses rare expertise in European security architecture, NATO doctrine, and asymmetric warfare. Khaled’s deep operational insight and international perspective enable him to deliver precision-driven intelligence analysis and forward-looking strategic forecasts. A trusted contributor to high-level risk assessments and security briefings, he offers readers clarity on complex defence and security challenges. Khaled leads the National Security and Fact Analysis sections at BDMilitary. He holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from the University of Groningen, The Netherlands, and is fluent in Dutch, French, and Arabic — combining linguistic dexterity with operational expertise to analyse security issues across cultures and regions.